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EU Leadership and Copenhagen: Internal and 
External Challenges
Chad Damro
negotiators will face a significant challenge at the Unit-
ed Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen 
in December 2009. At a previous conference in Bali, In-
donesia (2007), the participants agreed to negotiate a 
number of concrete measures to address global climate 
change beyond the Kyoto Protocol’s expiration in 2012. 
Although the related processes for achieving these con-
crete measures are complicated and in flux, what does 
seem certain is that the EU will have to perform a lead-
ing role if progress is to be made at Copenhagen. In-
deed, many observers already consider the EU a leader 
in this policy area due to its vigorous and innovative in-
ternal climate change policies and its ongoing efforts to 
shape multilateral climate change negotiations (Chris-
tiansen and Wettestad 2003; Hovi et al. 2003; Oberthür 
and Roche Kelly 2008; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007; 
Vogler and Stephan 2007; Zito 2005). But if the EU is 
to remain an international leader at and beyond Copen-
hagen, it will have to manage a number of internal and 
external challenges to its climate change ambitions.
Internal Challenges
The most important domestic policy develop-
ment helping to reinforce the EU’s leading role is 
its domestic Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the 
world’s largest and most advanced carbon market. 
Despite the EU’s firm commitment to emissions trad-
ing (Cass 2005), disagreements among its member 
states—over such thorny matters as national allo-
cations of permits—reveal potential implementation 
problems that will have to be overcome to ensure the 
EU’s internal objectives and international credibility.
As the EU pushes internationally for emission reduc-
tion targets, it must also remain conscious of the need 
to meet its own internal targets. The EU member states 
have agreed to cut their emissions by 20 percent from 
1990 levels by 2020, rising to 30 percent if the rest of the 
developed world agrees to the same reductions. Meeting 
these ambitious targets will require political commitment 
and improved performance from all EU member states.
In order to meet its emissions targets, the EU may 
have to broaden further the scope of its climate poli-
cies, in particular to encompass transport and non-car-
bon gases. While the decision to include aviation in the 
third phase of the ETS represents an important step in 
this direction, coverage of other transportation sectors 
will remain a contentious political objective. The Com-
mission’s proposal to extend the ETS to all greenhouse 
gases should further enhance the scheme but will also 
add new requirements to the monitoring and enforce-
ment of EU climate policy. Such measures will certainly 
the european union has established itself as the world’s 
leader on environmental issues. Thus it is fitting that 
all eyes will turn toward Europe in late 2009 to see if 
the much-heralded Copenhagen summit can forge 
a new global environmental agreement to replace 
the Kyoto Protocol. At this point, what will happen is 
anyone’s guess. A newly positive American posi-
tion boosts the chances of a deal, but the global eco-
nomic crisis will sap at all governments’ resolve and 
ability to deliver new commitments on cutting green-
house-gas emissions. In any case, with such mixed 
conditions in the background, it seems likely that EU 
leadership will matter a great deal for the outcome.
This issue’s forum dissects the EU’s leadership 
in global environmental issues from several different 
angles. Chad Damro provides an overview of the chal-
lenges to a strong EU role in Copenhagen, both from in-
ternal opponents and obstacles and from external bar-
gaining partners. Andrea Lenschow offers an account of 
how the EU reached its ambitious initial negotiating po-
sition—the so-called “20-20-20” call for 20% reductions 
to greenhouse-gas emissions and energy consumption 
and 20% reliance on renewable energy by 2020—that 
stresses how the European Commission used the EU’s 
emerging image as international environmental leader 
to force a deal past internal obstacles. In her view, the 
Commission successfully cajoled European skeptics to 
live up to the EU’s green reputation. Miranda Schreurs 
complements Lenschow’s top-down story with a look at 
more grassroots-level, bottom-up environmental leader-
ship, surveying the many ways in which Europe’s cities 
and other subnational governments have outpaced na-
tional- or EU-level environmental policies. Mitchell Smith, 
finally, takes a more explanatory cut into the subject, 
asking comparatively why the EU has recently adopted 
more stringent regulation in environmental and health 
policies than the United States. He discounts many of 
the usual suspects—broad cultural attitudes about mar-
ket intervention, for example, or the power of industrial 
lobbyists in the US—and argues that stronger EU regu-
lations have been driven by two things: broad pressures 
from the European integration project, and the specific 
roles of courts, which have effectively encouraged fed-
eral regulation in Europe while impeding it in the US. 
On a personal note, I’m delighted to have such a rich, 
comprehensive forum to mark my last issue as Editor of 
the Review. Readers are sure to enjoy similarly excellent 
forums under the guidance of the new Editor, Amie Kreppel.
Craig Parsons, EUSA  Review Editor
EUSA Review Forum
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encounter varying levels of opposition from different 
member states and stakeholder groups. The Com-
mission will have to build coalitions of support among 
diverse political and economic actors, taking care to 
identify the common public- and private-sector inter-
ests served by incorporating other sectors and gases 
into the ETS. Given this precarious landscape, the EU 
must develop strategies supported by financial service 
providers and other sectors that stand to benefit from 
emissions trading (Damro and MacKenzie 2008: 80-81).
External Challenges
In addition to challenges found in the domestic 
EU context, international factors are likely to compli-
cate the EU’s role in Copenhagen. While a multitude 
of potential obstacles and veto points emerge in inter-
national climate change politics, two challenges are 
particularly noteworthy: the current global financial 
crisis and the opposing positions of non-EU states.
Because the full extent and duration of the global 
financial crisis is unclear, discussion of its impact on 
the Copenhagen negotiations can only be specula-
tive at best. That said, it does appear that the current 
economic downturn will complicate efforts to reduce 
emissions in the EU and elsewhere. Emission reduc-
tions will require significant public and private invest-
ment at a time of weak economic performance. Given 
these conditions, it will be politically difficult for coun-
tries to commit to binding emission reductions, which 
are often seen as depressing carbon-based economic 
activity and leading to job losses. Concerns are also 
increasing about the ability of the EU and other devel-
oped countries to meet funding commitments to help 
developing countries produce clean energy and adapt 
to climate change. Without brighter economic growth 
prospects, such commitments are unlikely to mate-
rialize by the time of the Copenhagen negotiations.
At the same time, the EU must carefully consider 
the positions and interests of other participants in the 
climate change negotiations. Seven of these impor-
tant negotiators have already established the Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Cli-
mate (APP) as an alternative to the binding reductions 
promoted by the EU.  The creation of the APP reflects 
the emergence of a dense pattern of global climate 
governance that may weaken the prospects for col-
lective action and limit the ability of the EU to shape 
and negotiate the post-Kyoto agenda (Paterson 2009). 
Though not a cohesive negotiating bloc, the APP’s 
members emphasize technology-based solutions and 
share a determination that states should be allowed to 
set voluntarily their own goals for reducing emissions. 
While the EU accepts technological solutions as ad-
ditional measures to combat climate change, its insis-
tence on binding enforcement mechanisms suggests 
that compromise with the APP states will be difficult.
US Challenge to EU Leadership
Given the importance of the APP’s members as 
pivotal negotiators and significant emitters of green-
house gases, an adjustment in their position on binding 
commitments will be a crucial test for the EU’s leader-
ship. According to President Barack Obama, the United 
States is ready to assume international leadership in 
tackling climate change. Obama followed up his election 
victory with a New Energy for America plan that prom-
ises to make the US an international leader on climate 
change and calls for a national cap-and-trade program 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions eighty percent by 
2050. In addition, Obama launched the Major Econo-
mies Forum on Energy and Climate in April 2009.  Ac-
cording to the White House, this forum is intended “to 
facilitate a candid dialogue among major developed and 
developing economies, help generate the political lead-
ership necessary to achieve a successful outcome… in 
Copenhagen, and advance the exploration of concrete 
initiatives and joint ventures that increase the supply of 
clean energy while cutting greenhouse gas emissions.” 
While the US is an important member of the APP, 
a shift in its position alone will likely not be enough to 
pull along the other APP members. Although such a 
shift by the US would signal a major development in 
transatlantic climate change politics, it would only be a 
half-measure in the more important game of multilat-
eral climate change politics. The developing economies 
of the APP—in particular, China, as the world’s larg-
est producer of carbon dioxide—must be actively en-
gaged in the run-up to the Copenhagen conference. 
Here, the EU’s sustained leadership will be impera-
tive. The EU may be able to engage China, India and 
other developing countries in efforts to extend and link 
its ETS with other emissions trading schemes. Like-
wise, cooperation between the EU and these countries 
would help to reduce the costs of technological devel-
opment and transfer. Such cooperation would require 
the EU to demonstrate leadership by delivering on its 
financial commitments to support developing countries’ 
climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.
Conclusion
Despite these numerous internal and external chal-
lenges to EU leadership, the energy and resources 
the Union has already invested in the ongoing nego-
tiations and its own climate change policies suggest 
that it remains serious about shaping the post-Kyoto 
agenda. Likewise, the EU is clearly committed to emis-
sions trading and looks ready to continue its interna-
tional advocacy of binding emission reduction targets 
as the best approach to addressing climate change.
While much has been made of the EU’s leader-
ship in climate change, the years following Copen-
hagen will be an important test of this proposition. 
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How effective will the EU be at promoting its climate 
proposals both internally and externally? What does 
US re-engagement mean for the future of EU lead-
ership in this policy area? How will other important 
negotiators respond to the EU’s ongoing efforts?
Even if the prospects for progress at Copenhagen 
seem dim, the outcome of the negotiations will likely 
provide useful evidence for further scholarly investi-
gations into claims about EU leadership in the fight 
against climate change. In addition, the subsequent 
negotiations to replace the Kyoto Protocol will provide 
rich and exciting research prospects for new and es-
tablished scholars exploring EU politics, environmen-
tal politics and international relations more generally.
 
Chad Damro is Senior Lecturer of Politics and Inter-
national Relations at the University of Edinburgh. He 
is also Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, 
Bruges.
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The Internalization of External Pressure: 
EU Climate Change Policy
Andrea Lenschow
environmental policy—and recently climate policy in 
particular—is a policy field where the EU claims an in-
ternational leadership role (Sbragia and Damro 1999: 
53, Gupta and Grubb 2000). In the Kyoto Protocol from 
1997 the EU committed itself to the highest (collective) 
target of an 8 percent reduction in emissions, while the 
US agreed to only a reduction of 7 percent and Japan 
6 percent. EU member states were also comparatively 
quick in ratifying, whereas the US has failed to ratify the 
Protocol to this day. Arguably it was due to EU leader-
ship—and the commitment of several EU presidencies—
that other large powers eventually ratified the Treaty so 
that the Protocol eventually could come into force on 16 
February 2005. Now, with the Kyoto targets expiring in 
2012, international negotiations are taking place under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) with the goal of reaching an agree-
ment that will govern action beyond that date. With its 
“independent commitment” of March 2007 to reduce by 
2020 the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of the EU 
by 20 percent from the 1990 baseline and a promise of 
a 30 percent cut if other countries join in, the European 
Council became “a major driving force behind the launch 
of negotiations on a global post-2012 climate agreement 
that was agreed by the parties to the UNFCCC in Bali in 
December 2007” (Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008: 2).
International leadership of the European Union 
builds on at least three capacities: First, the EU mem-
ber states had to reach a coherent collective position 
with regard to a progressive reduction target and oth-
er elements of the negotiations placing it in the lead-
ing position. In this context it is notable that, in order 
to commit to the 8 percent reduction target, the EU 
devised an internal burden-sharing agreement with 
some member-states agreeing to higher reductions in 
order to allow other member states to even increase 
the emissions of GHGs. Such uneven distribution of 
costs among its members suggests either a high de-
gree of solidarity or a remarkable capacity to reach in-
ternal bargains and balance interests. In this context, 
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Oberthür and Roche Kelly pointed to the sophisticat-
ed system of internal coordination based on a Coun-
cil working group, several expert groups, designated 
lead negotiators as well as issue leaders that helped 
to develop and manage a coherent and robust nego-
tiation position (Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008: 4-5).
Second, the EU requires skills in negotiation man-
agement in order to (a) gain acceptance for the EU col-
lective solution and (b) to ensure the ratification of its 
international partners. In fact, while the EU had not yet 
been a driving force in establishing the architecture of 
the Kyoto agreement—it was the US that had played a 
more central role in this phase—the EU has contributed 
a great deal to the saving of the Protocol after the Bush 
administration effectively withdrew in early 2001. Not 
least due to its lead in making substantive commitments 
(leadership by example), the EU proved increasingly ca-
pable in leading the process of the negotiations on the ba-
sis of “soft” governance mechanisms (e.g. Damro 2006). 
Yet, third, the EU needs to prove that it is a cred-
ible example and show its capacity to meet its Kyoto 
commitments. On this dimension the EU performance 
has been discontinuous and has recently reached a 
critical juncture. After a slow beginning the EU policy 
machinery started to run in the 2000s: In 2000 the EU 
Commission adopted a European Climate Change Pro-
gramme; in subsequent years several directives on 
renewable energy sources, on energy efficiency and 
energy saving were adopted and the innovative emis-
sion trading scheme (ETS) was passed. However, with 
the GHG emission reductions stagnating and the im-
plementation of crucial policies, including the ETS, the 
renewable energy directive and a voluntary agreement 
with the automobile industry, showing serious prob-
lems, doubts had been getting louder about whether 
the EU could keep its own commitment and remain a 
credible leader in the post-Kyoto climate negotiations, 
and specifically in the decisive meeting in Copenha-
gen schedules for December 2009. Hence, for the Co-
penhagen meeting the EU needed to present concrete 
proposals of how to achieve the ambitious targets of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and boosting re-
newable energy production by 20 percent by 2020. 
The following pages are devoted to illustrating how 
the prospect of losing credibility among the international 
partners spurred the internal policy developments re-
lated to climate change facilitating a deal among the 
member-states and the endorsement of Parliament at 
the end of the French Presidency in December 2008.
Closing the credibility gap
Implementing its international commitments has 
long been the Achilles’ heel in EU global environmen-
tal leadership (Gupta and Grubb 2000). With regard 
to climate change it has been argued that the Coun-
cil’s “independent commitment” from March 2007 and 
the climate and energy package proposed by the Eu-
ropean Commission in early 2008 have a significant 
potential to close the suspected implementation—and 
hence credibility—gap (e.g. Oberthür and Roche Kelly 
2008). The European Council had announced a reduc-
tion of GHG emissions of the EU by 20 percent from 
the 1990 level by 2020 (and 30 percent if other indus-
trialized countries made comparable commitments), 
to increase the share of renewable energy sources to 
20 percent until 2020, and to reduce projected energy 
consumption by 20 percent by 2020 (European Council 
2007)—the so-called 20-20-20 commitment. The Com-
mission’s climate change package including four pro-
posals on climate and energy constituted a significant 
step in operationalizing this commitment by introducing:
• a revised ETS covering more emissions and 
allowing firms in one EU country to buy allowances in 
any other country;
• emission reduction targets and burden-sharing 
arrangements for industries not covered by the ETS 
(e.g. buildings, transport, waste);
• legally enforceable targets for increasing the 
share of renewables in the energy mix amounting to an 
overall increase of 20 percent;
• new rules on carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) and on environmental subsidies.
Decisive for maintaining the credibility of EU leader-
ship, however, was the step from declaratory to a le-
gally binding commitment, hence the actual adoption 
of the climate package by the Council and Parliament 
in time for the next big international round of negotia-
tions, namely prior to the Copenhagen meeting in De-
cember 2009. Under enormous time pressure this step 
was taken despite the diverse institutional and proce-
dural obstacles to such a complex policy package, de-
spite the increasingly difficult economic context linked 
to the material as well as discursive constraints im-
posed by the financial crisis, and despite growing po-
litical concerns especially in the new member-states of 
the EU and among industrial interests. In other words, 
the commitment was kept despite mounting institution-
al, ideational and interest-based obstacles inside the 
EU decision making apparatus. How was that done?
I argue that the widely shared objective of the Eu-
ropean Union to play a credible and progressive global 
leadership role served as a complementary policy frame 
in support of the otherwise vulnerable environmental 
policy frame during the internal discussions. The enor-
mous publicity of the climate change issue and the ab-
sence of any credible international leader in this field 
provided the opportunity for EU policy entrepreneurs 
like Commission President J.M. Barroso or EP Presi-
dent H.G. Pöttering to marry notions of the EU being 
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an environmental frontrunner as well as a “normative 
power” (Manners 2002), thereby lifting the image of 
the EU both internally and externally. Quotes like the 
following nicely illustrate the linking of the two frames: 
We can help to create a more just globaliza-
tion if we spread our norms and rules to regu-
late global interactions. Europe is already one of 
the leading international norm-setters… in envi-
ronmental protection, and in many other areas. 
It is not difficult to understand why European 
Union is the best prepared to promote a mul-
tilateral way of international and transnational 
governance. (Barroso 2008; emphasis added) 
In half a century of European integration, we 
have managed to create lasting peace between 
our countries. Now, the European Union has to 
tackle the huge task of creating peace with the 
planet we live on… Ultimately, fighting climate 
change is not only a political challenge, it is a moral 
imperative (Pöttering 2008; emphasis in original)
Turning from the discursive to the opera-
tional dimension, given the time frame im-
posed by the forthcoming Copenhagen con-
ference, the double discourse on environment 
and international leadership was used to put 
climate change policy making on the fast lane: 
The European Union has promised to lead 
the world towards a global post-Kyoto agree-
ment with binding targets. The eyes of the 
world will be on us throughout 2008 and 2009 
until Copenhagen. We must fulfil these expec-
tations!” (Pöttering 2008, emphasis changed).
Time pressure on the internal decision-making pro-
cess even increased due to the forthcoming Parliamen-
tary elections in June 2009 and therefore the implicit 
need to reach a decision by the end of 2008, that is, pri-
or to the start of electoral campaigning. Time pressure 
in this discursively enhanced version now featured as 
a constant disciplining context throughout the decision 
making process that followed the Commission proposal.
Negotiations in the European Parliament were con-
ducted under formally complex procedural rules. There 
were two leading EP committees, the environment 
(ENVI) and the industry, technology and energy (ITRE) 
committees, which were supposed to cooperate accord-
ing to the rules of the enhanced Hughes procedure. Apart 
from sophisticated forms of consultation, this meant that 
specific responsibilities within the climate change pack-
age were divided between the committees—ITRE lead-
ing the renewables dossier while ENVI taking primary 
responsibility for the revised ETS, the new burden-shar-
ing arrangements and CCS. Although debates within 
the ITRE committee were initially strongly influenced 
by general economic growth and competitiveness con-
cerns, on the one hand, and by some members who 
voiced a general skepticism with regards to the scien-
tific basis of the proposed climate change policy (i.e. 
the actual need for GHG emission reduction), on the 
other hand, these substantive issues were moderated 
by the perceived need (on the part of the majority of 
the committee) to reach a compromise if at all possi-
ble during the first reading stage. Inter-committee ne-
gotiations were largely concentrated in the committee 
secretariats and around the rapporteurs plus shadow 
rapporteurs, all aiming towards a common ground. This 
time constraint tamed the free exchange of views and 
restrained open conflict both within the committees and 
between them as it would be otherwise typical for this 
stage—especially in complex policy matters like the 
climate change package (interviews EP, May 2008). 
Taming effects also resulted from inter-institutional 
negotiations—the so-called trialogue meeting—which 
took place more or less in parallel with the inter-commit-
tee consultations. An agreement was reached internally 
that the European Parliament shall speak with one voice 
during the trialogue meetings following the respective 
lead committee. Consequently, inter-committee consul-
tations took place “in the shadow” of the trialogue more 
immediately than in the shadow of the Plenary vote. Es-
pecially for ITRE this created some pressure to submit 
to the international agenda of the Council and to limit 
fundamental opposition to the package. Any suggestion 
that the negotiations should go into second reading was 
considered inappropriate (interviews EP, May 2008).
Similar time pressure was felt at Council level. In 
October 2008, in midst of the financial crisis, the Eu-
ropean Council declared its commitment to stick to the 
ambitious climate and energy targets agreed in 2007 
and 2008 (Council 2008). The financial crisis opened 
a window of opportunity for critics of the package. The 
ETS dossier in particular was heavily attacked by East 
European countries with other countries adding their 
demands for special treatment. Also, energy-intensive 
industry fought for leniency during economically tough 
times and argued, for instance, against the auction-
ing system that was planned to distribute the emission 
permits. Yet, in very intensive negotiations the French 
Presidency led the Council towards a compromise which 
was agreed at the final summit meeting in December 
2008, i.e. on schedule for the Copenhagen agenda and 
less than a year after the introduction of the Commis-
sion’s negotiation package. While this compromise did 
indeed considerably water down the initial Commission 
proposal, the 20-20-20 target was maintained—and 
hence, the core of the EU’s international commitment.
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On 17 December 2008 the package was endorsed 
in the EP and by April 2009 all related EU legisla-
tion was formally adopted in the Council of Ministers. 
Hence, despite softening the environmental mea-
sures—leading to heavy criticisms among the environ-
mental NGO community—the EU will be able to appear 
at the international scene as a leader sticking to its 
commitments even at tough economic times. From the 
perspective in this essay it is more remarkable, how-
ever, that entrepreneurial policy-makers were able to 
generate such enormous dynamism from the interna-
tional context and the EU’s aspirations at this level to 
overcome both procedural complexities and substantial 
opposition in the internal decision-making processes. 
External credibility and democratic 
internal procedures
Finally, we may ask whether international lead-
ership and policy output has been secured at the ex-
pense of internal democratic and legitimate proce-
dures. This is a difficult question that would require 
a careful specification of the concepts used and the 
standards applied—requirements that cannot be met 
here. Hence, I will offer some brief observations invit-
ing further discussion and elaborations elsewhere:
From an institutional perspective, the climate 
change package suggests that complex decision mak-
ing procedures in the EU—the co-decision procedure 
between EP and Council, the Hughes procedures inside 
the EP—do not necessarily prolong decision-making 
processes. This has been noted elsewhere in the lit-
erature and nevertheless, the concentrated and speedy 
adoption of such complex package is astonishing.
Arguably, this policy success has been achieved 
due to a specific negotiation style. What we have wit-
nessed inside the EP and in the context of the trialogue 
meeting was the art of politics—possibly at the expense 
of the art of deliberation. The art of politics, in turn, was 
not limited to a skilled balancing of costs and benefits 
among the negotiation partners on the way towards a 
final compromise—though features of that were clearly 
visible in the final Council agreement; it also consisted 
in the capacity to link a policy discourse to an “existen-
tial discourse,” namely the quest of playing a distinct 
and significant role in international politics. Building on 
a widely accepted myth of a “green Europe” (Lenschow 
and Sprungk, forthcoming) EU policy entrepreneurs are 
trying to provide substance to the aspiration of being an 
international “normative power,” thereby creating policy 
salience internally. Such internally constructed salience 
may make efforts to prolong the negotiation and con-
tinue deliberation look hostile to the European project. 
While such rhetorical stigmatization may not conform 
to standards of “good democratic practice,” it is an in-
dication of a potentially highly politicized process of an 
internationalization of EU policy making in the name of 
European normative leadership, which followed formal 
democratic procedures as we know it in “high politics.”
Andrea Lenschow is a Professor of Political Science 
at Osnabrück University
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Local Climate Action in the European Union
Miranda A. Schreurs
the european union (eu) has received much attention 
in recent years for the leadership role it has played in 
the international climate negotiations. Attention has fo-
cused on the EU’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, its 
initiation of a carbon emissions trading system, and its 
establishment of a relatively far reaching emission re-
duction goal for the post-Kyoto period (20 percent be-
low 1990 levels by 2020). There has been less attention 
focused on the many exciting climate initiatives occur-
ring at the local level. This is quite surprising given the 
strong interest that has been focused on local and state 
levels initiatives in the United States where until the 
beginning of the Obama administration, federal action 
was limited (Rabe 2004; 2008; Pew Center on Global 
Change 2004; Schreurs 2004 and 2008; Schreurs, Se-
lin, and VanDeveer 2009). In contrast, climate policy 
making in the EU has been seen as largely top-down. 
In reality, there has been considerable grassroots ac-
tivity for climate change across the European Union.
Many local communities in the European Union 
are pioneering climate action. It is at the local and 
regional levels in Europe that some of the greatest 
strides are being made in energy efficiency improve-
ments, the introduction of green technologies and 
processes, the implementation of innovative hous-
ing solutions, and creative climate-friendly community 
projects. The ability of the European Union to meet its 
greenhouse gas emission reduction goals will certainly 
be tied to no small extent to local and regional action. 
There are numerous examples of local climate 
leaders in Europe.  A growing number of small towns 
and districts within cities have managed to go 100 
percent renewable, including Dardesheim, Germa-
ny; Varese Ligure, Italy; the western harbour district 
of Mälmo, Sweden; and, Samsø Island, Denmark. 
The city of Freiburg, Germany is often held up as 
a model of sustainability.  In 1996, the city introduced 
its Climate Protection Concept. In 2007, it established 
a goal to achieve a 40 percent reduction in its green-
house gas emissions by 2030 relative to 1992 levels. 
The city has pushed the use of combined heat and pow-
er, renewable energy, and public transportation.  It is 
one of many local communities with a strong green tilt.
Copenhagen, Denmark is another green leader. 
With a substantial share of its electricity produced from 
wind power, and a bicycle-loving culture, per capita CO2 
emissions in Copenhagen are about one-third below the 
national average. As host to the 2009 Conference of the 
Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(COP 15) as well as to the 2009 World Climate Summit for 
Mayors, Copenhagen has developed an ambitious plan 
to become the world’s first CO2 neutral capital by 2025. 
Its greenhouse gas mitigation plans call for an expan-
sion of the city’s rail lines, further development of the city 
bicycling program, a congestion charging system, and 
energy efficiency improvements in existing buildings. 
In an effort to bring greater visibility to these kinds 
of urban environmental initiatives, the European Com-
munity launched a competition for designation as the 
“European Green Capital.” The cities of Stockholm, 
Sweden and Hamburg, Germany were the first award 
recipients, respectively for 2009 and 2010. Stockholm’s 
per capita carbon dioxide emissions are half the na-
tional average. Stockholm plans to be fossil-fuel free by 
2050. Per capita emissions in the city have been cut 
by 25 percent since 1995. Hamburg has introduced 
ambitious CO2 reduction goals of 40% by 2020 and by 
80% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. After a peak in 
the mid-1990s, CO2 emissions per person have been 
reduced by about 15% compared to 1990. Hamburg’s 
Climate Action Policy is comprised of over 275 projects 
and measures concentrating on sharp improvements 
in energy efficiency and a structural transformation 
towards an environmentally-friendly energy system. 
Various transnational municipal climate networks 
have been established within Europe, including Cli-
mate Alliance (Klima Bündnis), Cities for Climate Pro-
tection, and Energie-Cités, which were set up after 
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development in 1992. These networks have pro-
moted voluntary measures for climate change and 
energy efficiency across Europe (Kern and Bulkeley 
2009). Climate Alliance, for example, has over 1400 
members that have agreed to work to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions. It issues an annual Cli-
mate Star award for local climate action initiatives.
Somewhat similar in idea to the US Mayors’ Cli-
mate Protection Agreement launched in 2005, in Feb-
ruary 2009, 400 European cities agreed to a Covenant 
of Mayors’ Initiative on climate change. The mayors 
have pledged to go beyond the EU’s 20 percent green-
house gas reduction goal by 2020 relative to 1990 lev-
els through the implementation of a Sustainable Energy 
Action Plan (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sustainable/
doc/covenant_en.pdf). Although the Covenant of May-
ors’ Initiative does not establish any specific emission 
targets, it does spell out steps that will be taken for the 
development of an Action Plan, including the establish-
ment of a baseline emission inventory and agreement 
to submit implementation reports and share experience. 
The covenant spells out the role of local governments in 
implementation of energy efficiency measures, renew-
able energy projects, and other energy-related activities. 
The European Commission is funding various ini-
tiatives to promote local and regional climate action. 
With Commission backing, the European Secretariat 
of ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability has 
launched a Local Government Project Action website 
to promote the sharing of information on initiatives for 
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climate and energy within the European Union (http://
www.lg-action.eu/index.php?id=7251). Commission 
funding also supports EUCO2 80/50, an initiative to aid 
metropolitan regions in developing action plans and 
systems for measuring progress on reducing green-
house gas emissions. This project links 21 European 
metropolitan regions led by the Metropolitan Region 
of Hamburg and with the backing of MATREX and the 
European Commission. The regions make use of the 
Greenhouse gas Regional Inventory Project (GRIP) com-
puter simulation, to develop comparable Europe-wide 
energy scenarios and measures metropolitan regions 
can take to meet international targets for greenhouse 
gas emission reductions. The participating metropoli-
tan regions have as their target an 80 percent reduc-
tion in CO2 emissions by 2050 (http://www.eurome-
trex.org/Docs/EUCO2/EUCO2_80_50_Brochure.pdf). 
These examples represent a few of the many ex-
citing local climate initiatives that are emerging across 
Europe.  This does not mean, however, that all local 
communities have been equally enthusiastic about in-
troducing climate plans. Nor does it mean that all com-
munities have been successful at implementing their 
greenhouse gas emission reduction goals. Given that 
greenhouse gas emissions are tied to a wide array of 
policy areas and functions found at the local and region-
al levels, ranging from urban and transportation plan-
ning, to building requirements, energy structures and 
systems, nature conservation, and water use, the role 
of local communities and regions will be critical in meet-
ing the European Union’s greenhouse gas emission tar-
gets.  Greater attention to both vertical and horizontal 
governance mechanisms and funding streams for local 
initiatives will be necessary to spread widely the kinds of 
initiatives found among Europe’s local climate pioneers.
Miranda Schreurs is Professor of Comparative Poli-
tics at the Freie Universität Berlin
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Explaining Divergent Health and Environmental 
Regulation in the United States and 
the European Union
Mitchell P. Smith
during the first decade of the 21st century, the United 
States has adopted an increasingly relaxed regula-
tory posture in the face of critical challenges to public 
health and the environment.  This is true of regulation 
of recycling of end-of-life products including autos and 
electronic components, of health claims on food labels, 
and of potentially hazardous chemicals.  Coinciden-
tally, the European Union has gravitated toward more 
restrictive regulation in these very same areas, estab-
lishing more stringent controls on the recycling of au-
tos at the end of their useful lives (2000); health claims 
on food labels (2005); and a more rigorous regime for 
regulation of chemicals (2006). How might we explain 
these diverging regulatory trajectories of the world’s 
two largest market economies in an era of rising pub-
lic awareness of dangers to the public and planet?
Observers offer several explanations.  The most 
prominent of these refers to systematic differences in 
societal willingness to tolerate risk, or in cultural per-
ceptions of types of risk considered tolerable.  Such 
arguments range from those emphasizing European re-
sponses to past food scares, including the instance of 
BSE in beef and dioxin in carbonated beverages, poul-
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try and eggs in 1999, to those suggesting Europeans 
are accepting of traditional foods but more suspicious of 
new technologies than American consumers -- exhibit-
ed, for example, in differences in American and Europe-
an attitudes toward genetically modified foods (Echols, 
1998; Dunlop, 2000; Rosendal, 2005; Kurzer, 2005). 
However, cultural explanations resting on attitudinal dif-
ferences across populations fail to account for the low 
level of risk tolerance and high level of precaution exhib-
ited by past regulatory policy in the U.S.—including, for 
example, a virtual ban on health claims on food labels 
for most of the twentieth century (Pappas, 2002)—as 
well as more recent policy in a variety of areas, includ-
ing tobacco consumption (Kurzer, 2005) and regulation 
of nitrogen oxides from diesel vehicles (Oye, 2005: 62). 
An emphasis on the balance between state and 
market is an alternative to the cultural explanation.  This 
approach underscores the distinction between busi-
ness-centered, liberal US capitalism and state-centered 
European dirigisme involving a significantly greater will-
ingness to constrain market exchange in order to gener-
ate public goods (Krämer, 2004: 68).  However, this ex-
planation of diverging regulatory trajectories confronts 
the fact that policy debates within EU institutions reflect 
a deep and widely shared concern with the cost burden 
of regulation on industry.  Indeed, industrial impact as-
sessment has come to play an increasingly prominent 
role in the drafting of EU regulation (Cecot et al, 2008). 
In this regard, EU regulatory discourse and policy debate 
in fact closely resembles that in the United States.   
Advocates of the state-market balance explanation 
also refer to the role of courts in bolstering market com-
petition in the U.S. setting.  Court decisions that have 
fleshed out the practical meaning of regulations have in 
fact tended to impose extremely high evidentiary stan-
dards on regulators like the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) to justify their rulings, and to demand that 
authorities restrain regulatory solutions to those pro-
portional to the health or environmental objectives they 
seek to attain.  This has made outright bans by the FDA 
on dangerous substances (asbestos, e.g.) or on claims 
(as on food labels) difficult to sustain.  The striking point, 
though, is that decisions of the European Court of Justice 
follow this pattern remarkably closely.  Proportionality and 
free commercial speech doctrine—justified by the EU’s 
essential principle of free movement of goods—have 
become important constraints on national regulation in 
EU member states.   In other words, preliminary rul-
ings by the ECJ frequently have rejected interpretations 
of national regulations that restrict the free movement 
of goods and services across borders.  Ultimately, con-
trasting regulatory trends between the U.S. and EU can 
not be ascribed to an institutional proclivity in Europe to 
constrain market exchange in favor of the public welfare. 
Finally, scholars have emphasized the role of the 
industry lobby in the U.S. -- both its organizational re-
sources and its access to regulatory policy making (Tan-
guay et al, 2004).  In contrast, some scholars studying 
the dynamics of policy making and representation in the 
EU have emphasized the significant access of orga-
nized environmental interests to policy making, whether 
through the European Parliament’s Committee on the 
Environment, the Environment DG of the European 
Commission, or environment ministries in high-standard 
EU member state governments.  However, two crucial 
realities confront this explanation for contrasting trajec-
tories.  First, whatever the impact of industry lobbying 
on regulatory policy making in the U.S., court decisions 
have been decisive in determining the consequences of 
regulatory design in the areas of chemicals and nutrition 
labeling regulation.  And second, access to the policy 
making process of industry interests organized at the 
European level has expanded substantially as the pow-
ers of the European Parliament (EP) have grown (Eising, 
2007: 350, 352; Bouwen, 2004).  As the EP has moved 
toward full powers of codecision, industry associations 
have invested more substantial organizational resourc-
es in and have identified productive access points with-
in the Parliament (Coen, 2007; Smith, 2008).  For ex-
ample, close examination of the process that generated 
the EU’s recent comprehensive regulatory framework 
for the chemicals sector reveals a shift over time from 
the ability of environmental interests to set the agen-
da to augmented industry influence over EP positions.
Ultimately, two factors explain the contrasting reg-
ulatory trajectories of the U.S. and the EU.  First, all 
capitalist democracies confront a perceived tradeoff 
between regulatory objectives and costs to industry. 
Particularly in traded sectors, such as chemicals, policy 
makers face a “regulator’s dilemma” emerging from the 
tension between regulatory objectives and internation-
al competitiveness (Kapstein, 1989).  However, in the 
case of the EU, the tradeoff between regulatory objec-
tives and costs is a regulatory trilemma.  The standard 
tradeoff is compounded for the EU since regulation 
also serves a goal beyond immediate regulatory objec-
tives such as protection of environment, health or con-
sumers—the goal of advancing European integration. 
The implications of court decisions represent a sec-
ond explanatory factor for diverging U.S. and EU regu-
latory trajectories.  Courts have sharply constrained 
federal regulatory ambitions in the U.S.  Rulings issued 
by the ECJ, while coinciding with those in the U.S. in 
terms of their tendency to protect open markets and 
free commercial speech, have had a very different 
function.  Rulings undermining national regulatory rig-
or in the name of the free flow of goods have served 
as catalysts for EU institutions to seek to expand the 
EU’s regulatory ambit by sharply delineating areas 
where single market regulation remains incomplete. 
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The EU’s Regulatory Trilemma
The figure below depicts the EU’s regula-
tory trilemma, in which the European integra-
tion objective compounds the classic tradeoff be-
tween regulatory goals and costs to industry:
EU regulation induces interest articulation at the 
European level, harmonizes standards, and intensi-
fies exchange across borders of EU member states. 
Debates over regulatory outcomes at the EU level 
themselves serve the objective of integration.  Inter-
est aggregation and articulation and policy debate at 
the European level constitute what we might term the 
“process” benefits of EU regulatory policy making.
The EU’s regulatory trilemma produces characteris-
tics of regulatory behavior that differ in critical respects 
from regulation at the national level in economic com-
petitors of the EU, especially the U.S.  For example, 
the U.S. regulatory structure may accommodate in-
dustry resistance to command and control regulation 
through arrangements for voluntary regulation, includ-
ing programs that rely on the impact of information and 
moral suasion, such as the toxic release inventory, or 
TRI.  This also may be accomplished through regulato-
ry preemption by industry, typically consisting of cross-
industry consortiums of firms cooperating with govern-
ment agencies to encourage improved environmental 
stewardship and intensified research and development 
focused on cost-effective forms of environmental reme-
diation.  However, voluntary agreements typically are 
not a productive means of advancing European integra-
tion.  Consequently, EU institutions are more inclined 
than U.S. regulators toward compulsory regulation. 
Courts in the US and EU
The history of regulation of health claims on food 
labels in the United States illuminates the central role 
of the precautionary principle, and also demonstrates 
that courts rather than industry lobbying account for the 
recent decline in regulatory rigor in the U.S.  Many legal 
scholars portray the FDA as adhering rigidly for nearly 
a century—stretching from the Federal Food and Drugs 
Act of 1906 through the less restrictive 1993 Nutrition 
Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) and the seemingly 
permissive Food and Drug Administration Modernization 
Act of 1997—to an untenably restrictive regulatory ap-
proach (Blim, 1994); one that is excessively paternalistic 
(Fealk-Stickler, 2005: 96), betrays the intentions of Con-
gress, denies valuable information to consumers, and, 
ultimately, violates the First Amendment protection of free 
speech.  The FDA’s behavior is not at all consistent with 
the notion of a cultural proclivity to tolerate risk.  In the 
end, court decisions rather than acts of Congress have 
eroded restraints on nutrition labeling by finding that the 
FDA could achieve its objective of consumer protection 
by ordering the use of disclaimers rather than the out-
right suppression of health claims (Pappas, 2002: 30).1 
In the case of the EU, courts reached similar deci-
sions to those in the U.S. on issues of proportionality 
of regulatory remedies and free commercial speech. 
However, crucial for the EU was that different stan-
dards across member-states raised concerns in the 
courts about interference with the free flow of goods 
across borders (European Commission, 2001).  In in-
stances where governments enacted restrictive regu-
lations governing health claims, they risked incompat-
ibility with Community law by interfering with the free 
movement of goods.  A series of ECJ preliminary rul-
ings in the early 2000s established that national rules 
providing for outright restrictions of health claims failed 
the test of proportionality.  In Commission v Austria 
(Case C-221/00), the Court ruled that the total prohi-
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Austria’s 1975 Federal law on trade in foodstuffs vio-
lated the principle of proportionality with the objectives 
sought.  In its Douwe Egberts ruling (Case C-239/02), 
the Court found that a 1980 Belgian law which had the 
effect of banning the weight control claim of a coffee 
product infringed EU law.  As an alternative to outright 
prohibition of the claim, regulatory authorities had the 
option of employing the less restrictive approach of ob-
ligating the producer to supply evidence supporting the 
claim.  The regulatory remedy was accordingly dispro-
portionate to the objective of protecting human health.
While the immediate effect of these cases was to 
constrain highly restrictive national regulations in order 
to protect open markets, the enduring impact was to 
stimulate support for EU-level regulation.  In its 2001 
“Discussion Paper on Nutrition and Functional Claims,” 
the Commission’s Health and Consumer Protection DG 
wrote that regulatory differences across member-states 
“could act as barriers to guaranteeing a high level of 
consumer and public health protection, and could con-
stitute obstacles to the free movement of foodstuffs and 
the proper functioning of the internal market” (Europe-
an Commission, 2001: paragraph 4, page 3).  Council 
members, meanwhile, sought to reestablish the regula-
tory controls eroded by preliminary rulings of the ECJ.  In 
response to these preferences of national health minis-
ters, the Commission in 2003 proposed a regulation that 
would restrict the use of health claims on food packaging. 
Demonstrating the rising influence of organized 
industry interests in the Parliament, the EP stripped 
the Commission regulatory proposal of its most con-
troversial element--a provision for nutrition profiles 
that would preclude health claims in cases of foods 
with high levels of fat, sugar, or salt.  However, illus-
trating the power of ECJ rulings to mobilize national 
actors at the European level, the Council of Health 
Ministers succeeded in reintroducing nutrition pro-
files into the final regulation of December 2006.
Fundamental elements of the EU and U.S. regulatory 
contexts coincide.  Industrial competitiveness is a central 
concern in both cases, and policy making draws heavily 
on regulatory impact assessment.   Courts uphold strict 
proportionality in the application of regulatory remedies 
and give extensive protection to free commercial speech 
in both venues.  Ultimately, it is the third leg of the EU’s reg-
ulatory tradeoff—the objective and process of European 
integration—that illuminates the divergence of EU and 
U.S. regulation in the realms of environment and health. 
Mitchell P. Smith is Associate Professor of Political 
Science at the University of Oklahoma
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EUSA EU as a Global Actor 
Interest Section Essay 
“Your Choice is Peace”: Testing the EU Model in 
the New Global Insecurity Environment
Stephanie B. Anderson and Thomas R. Seitz1
the nature of the new global insecurity environment 
(NGIE) should promote greater cooperation between 
the US and EU in addressing security threats as they 
develop.  Since the mid-1990s, security challenges 
have increasingly been of a non-conventional nature. 
These challenges are well matched to Europe's pur-
ported strengths in such areas as development as-
sistance, promotion of good governance and security 
sector reform.  At the same time, the US has been 
coming around to the key role of development and hu-
man security issues in its own security policy having 
confronted the limits of overly military approaches in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  In any event, the challenges of 
the NGIE are too vast for the US to address on its own. 
Accordingly, Europe should be in a position to play a 
leading role in meeting the challenges of the NGIE.
The European Union has not been shy in extolling 
both the virtues and the appeal of its model, especially 
compared to the US.  However, how different is the 
EU model from the US model?  Is the EU model supe-
rior and more attractive to target countries?  Is the EU 
model transferable, and, if so, does the EU have the 
capabilities to do so?  What are the bases for these 
presumptions of superiority?  This paper explores 
the potential of the EU model in the world context. 
A New Global Insecurity Environment
In their initial responses to high-profile terror at-
tacks in the US in September 2001 and subsequent 
attacks in Spain and the UK, security establishments 
on both sides of the Atlantic essentially 'lapsed into 
the familiar'.  The US responded, seemingly by re-
flex, with military measures rooted in Cold War se-
curity approaches that were, themselves, products 
of America's experiences in the Second World War. 
Europeans, for their part, formulated responses 
shaped by years of experience fighting highly lethal, 
but largely “home grown” terrorist organizations.
However, while 9/11 could be viewed by some in 
Europe as America's (admittedly cataclysmic) initiation 
into the anti-terror fight that Europeans had been wag-
ing for a generation or more, the nature of subsequent 
attacks, especially those in Spain and the UK, led se-
curity establishments in Europe to see that the new in-
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security environment was just that.  The pattern formed 
by these attacks represented something qualitatively 
different from the terror threats Europe had been com-
bating for so many years.2  The US and Europe alike 
faced an insecurity environment that was, in many ways, 
a product and a function of globalization processes.
Studies on globalization, as a phenomenon, often 
focus on what emanates from the West into the non-
Western world, from liberal-capitalist economic prac-
tices and norms, to unregulated movements of almost 
unfathomable amounts of capital, to what are viewed 
as invariably corrosive features of Western culture.  In 
many ways, the new insecurity environment is all about 
what globalization brings back to the West.  As Gid-
dens, Rosenau, Robertson and others have argued for 
years, globalization embodies opposing, even dialecti-
cal tendencies: It generates local responses; it frag-
ments as it integrates.3   Policies and practices initiated 
by the West can generate social and political upheaval, 
economic dislocation, and even armed conflict abroad. 
While these crises have often been viewed in the West 
as simply “out there,” their products have been coming 
“home” to the West, and can no longer be dismissed 
or ignored.  They manifest themselves in forms that 
include refugee flows, epidemics or potential pandem-
ics of infectious diseases, transnational criminal or-
ganizations, as well as attacks by terrorist networks. 
These threats have given rise to an increased 
interest in “upstream” security measures. These are 
efforts to improve stability, security (broadly defined), 
governance and overall conditions in target states.  In 
essence, upstream security measures are analogous 
to fire prevention, designed to arrest deteriorating con-
ditions before they become so severe as to require the 
“firefighting” represented by traditional crisis respons-
es.  The EU has moved in this direction not only through 
pillar I development aid programs, but also through its 
pillar II ESDP law and order missions, and pillar III ex-
ternal Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) operations.  The 
Americans, for their part, having confronted the limits of 
military approaches in the new global insecurity envi-
ronment, are moving in a similar direction.  In calling for 
a new approach in "what has been dubbed the war on 
terror," US Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared: 
over the long term, the United States cannot 
kill or capture its way to victory.  Where pos-
sible, what the military calls kinetic operations 
should be subordinated to measures aimed 
at promoting better governance, economic 
programs that spur development, and efforts 
to address the grievances among the dis-
contented, from whom the terrorists recruit.4 
In short, security planners on both sides of the At-
lantic have come to recognize that internal security 
and stability in target states abroad is a key element 
of security at home.  At the same time, neither the US 
nor the EU can address these challenges alone; they 
can be met only through cooperation.  The challenges 
embodied in this new global insecurity environment 
fit well with EU strengths, drawing upon 'soft power' 
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capabilities the EU has developed while the US has 
allowed similar capabilities to atrophy in recent years.
The EU Model
In response to the question “Why the Euro-
pean Union?”, the europa.eu Website answers 
that out of the ashes of World War II, the Europe-
ans have learned the secret of peace and prosper-
ity through integration.5  In 50 short years, war be-
tween France and Germany is unthinkable, and, 
through cooperation, Europe has become one of the 
most economically prosperous areas of the world. 
This model, by definition, differs from the US model: 
Eurobarometer stated categorically EU citizens “feel, 
more or less spontaneously, that this model, built on 
the foundations of cultural and humanistic values, 
is unique. It sets Europe in opposition to the United 
States…” [emphasis in original].6  As opposed to the 
Americans, Europeans prefer to choose peace, as 
the EU’s advertisement7 for CFSP/ESDP attests: 
 
As the EU’s conscious choice is peace’, its 
model is presumed superior to the US model. 
According to one EU minister, the European 
Security Strategy “is Europe’s answer to the 
Americans. … This is about how we combine 
all our ‘soft power’ -- the diplomatic, econom-
ic, trade and security instruments – and, at 
the very end, the threat of the use of force.”8
 
The EU seeks to spread their model for “EUtopia” 
to the rest of the world. 9   Peter van Ham of the Neth-
erlands Institute for International Relations wrote, “The 
EU, by its very existence, opens the possibility of a to-
tally different model that downplays force and realpolitik 
and upgrades the role of law and trust. The European 
integration model is proof that the rule of law, institu-
tional arrangements and an elaborate diplomatic circus 
can tame nationalism and make military might well-nigh 
irrelevant.”10  As the European Commission explained, 
the EU has learned many lessons from its integration 
process, and the Europeans are ready for its mission 
civilisatrice:   “Based on the historic reconciliation of the 
nations and peoples of Europe, European integration 
has succeeded in consolidating peace and stability in 
Western Europe.  It is now set to export this stability.”11
    
Unchallenged and Unproven
Certainly the Europeans go to great lengths to dem-
onstrate that the EU model is vastly different from the 
American model, but is it?  Hubris has hurt the United 
States in its foreign relations.  It, too, believed it had the 
superior model for development, peace and prosperity 
with a strong power of attraction; however, the com-
munist model was attractive as well. The European 
Union need not only contend with the US, but against 
the power of the Chinese model and Islamic society 
models as well.  Furthermore, from the target country's 
perspective, the European Union needs to contradict 
accusations that its actions are ultimately imperial.
Today's responses to threats embodied in the NGIE 
are in many ways eerie reminders of US policy initia-
tives of the mid-Cold War era.  From the mid-1950s, 
Washington embarked on programs designed to pro-
mote security in the West by promoting security, sta-
bility and eventually development in areas of the world 
perceived to be weak and/or threatened.  Now, glo-
balization processes shake the international system; 
then, it was the decolonization process, with new and 
often unstable states emerging from former empires.
These programs, while geographically broad in 
scope, were modest in their objectives -- at least, at 
first.  They began as police reform programs, roughly 
analogous to security sector reform initiatives cur-
rently featured in US as well as EU foreign policies.12 
There was little in the way of resources and almost 
nothing in the way of theory to advance development 
efforts in target states.  The benefits as well as the 
attractions of the US market-democracy model were 
presumed.    The rationale was straightforward:  so 
long as external interference could be kept at bay 
(in that time, presumed to be communist agents 
and other “subversives”), development would natu-
rally proceed along Western, particularly American 
lines.  By the 1960s, US policy makers were increas-
ingly informed by modernization theory, which de-
scribed (among other things) clearly defined stages 
by which developing states could progress in accor-
dance with the Western, particularly American model.
However, things soon began to go off the rails. 
Washington discovered that promoting internal secu-
rity abroad involved much more than police reform.13 
Broader institution building and development initia-
tives were put into place, but, when push came to 
shove, efforts were concentrated on security institu-
tions and the security services themselves.  Before 
long, broader law and order objectives, such as the 
establishment of independent judiciaries intended 
to control those security forces, were abandoned.
One's obvious response might be to point out that 
that we have been talking about the EU, not the US, 
and there is no reason to suggest that EU policies 
could go the same way.  However, the EU's approach 
and doctrine for Security Sector Reform abroad is 
almost identical to that currently used by the US.14 
Additionally, Gregory Mounier warns that rule of law 
and good governance aspects of the missions are, in 
some cases, being subordinated to efforts to enhance 
16     Summer 2009  EUSA Review
the efficiency and capabilities of local security forces.15 
In other words, ESDP law and order missions may 
be in danger of going down the same primrose path 
as Washington's Cold War police reform missions.
A similar mistake in America's Cold War overseas 
internal security efforts was underestimating the appeal 
of competing models.  Cold War presidents, Eisen-
hower in particular, could never fathom the appeal of 
communist development models.  Washington viewed 
these as dead-ends, if not highly iniquitous, based on 
oppression and even slave labor.  However, to leaders 
of many developing countries, the rapid industrializa-
tion of the Soviet Union and progress made by the 
People's Republic of China offered attractive examples 
of how far an economy could advance in a short time.16 
Today, China once again offers an attractive alter-
native to Western models. The tremendous economic 
progress China has made in the last thirty years is an 
inspiring example to many leaders and populations 
in developing areas of the world.  Additionally, China 
has increasingly made overtures to such leaders, es-
pecially in Africa, extolling the virtues of a model that 
has delivered impressive economic growth without 
decentralization of authority or economic liberaliza-
tion.  The PRC may also have more appeal because 
of the association of the EU with former colonial pow-
ers.  Even in Bosnia, opinion has turned against the 
EU as their presence is increasingly seen as “qua-
si-colonial.”17  David Chandler has gone so far as 
to call the EU (and the US) an "empire in denial.”18
 
Conclusion:  High Stakes
Much is at stake with the success of the EU model 
abroad:  The EU risks its reputation at home, abroad, 
and people’s lives.
The European elites have placed great faith in the 
CFSP/ESDP as a tool to legitimize the European model 
at home where fewer and fewer citizens are participating 
in European elections and the appeal of extreme right 
is rising.19  Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commis-
sioner for External Relations, said that the EU had taken 
advantage of the pause after the constitutional failure:
 
to reconnect with our citizens’ most important 
concerns -- security, stability, prosperity and a 
stronger EU in the world.  We recognize that what 
our citizens want is results.  So we are concen-
trating on concrete achievements to show that 
the EU is part of the solution and not part of the 
problem.  And to show that rather than an “old 
continent,” unable to respond today's challeng-
es we've become a relevant dynamic power.20 
Presumably, EU High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana understood 
the concept when he called for "legitimacy through ac-
tion" and a "result oriented" pragmatism to gain the 
citizens’ confidence.21   Chris Patten, former Commis-
sioner for External Relations concurred:  “the EU’s cred-
ibility will be greatly enhanced if it can demonstrate its 
contribution to the safety and security of its citizens.”22 
He continued, “I am confident this debate will be one 
of the most appealing to European citizens, one which 
will make them feel more and more ‘euro-activists’.”23 
Abroad, the stakes are high as well. The United 
Nations has not been shy to call on the European 
Union to help stabilize crises throughout the world. 
The EU has assisted the UN in their missions through-
out the countries of former Yugoslavia and in Africa. 
On the ground, European soldiers must uphold EU 
values wherever they are deployed.  As Luc Frieden, 
Luxembourg minister and President-in-office of the 
Council explained, “European soldiers in the world 
are like our visiting card.”24  Therefore, the Council ad-
opted standards of behavior to be applied to all cat-
egories of personnel involved in ESDP operations. 
Any violation of human rights is to be reported, and 
all are to respect the ethnic, religious and cultural 
diversity of the local population.  Drug use and sex-
ual exploitation are forbidden:  “It is a code of con-
duct so that EU soldiers are worthy representatives 
of the EU in difficult missions throughout the world.”25 
However, even an EU soldier properly behaving 
under the rules of engagement (ROE) could compro-
mise the EU model and the image of the Europe as a 
peace power.  A major issue for the European Union 
is force protection; politicians want as few casualties 
as possible.  Therefore, the military tries to devise 
strong enough rules of engagement so that troops can 
protect themselves if the need arises.  The EU force 
working in the Congo had robust rules of engagement 
allowing “members of the force to defend themselves, 
even against drunk and drugged children soldiers.”26 
However, the image of EU peacekeepers firing on 
children could damage the EU’s reputation forever.
Finally, people may die.  The EU missions to date 
have generally been successful; however, it is only 
a matter of time until one fails.  Considering the lack 
of resources, that the EU may be pressed to take on 
missions that do not fit its instruments, that they are 
already overstretched, and that these troops will prob-
ably have to answer to national, European, and inter-
national (i.e., organizations such as the UN) command 
structures, the EU could become involved in another 
Srebrenica.  At Srebrenica, pressured to enter the fray, 
Dutch peacekeepers were unable to protect the civil-
ians in the safe zone.  Some academics and military 
analysts blamed the lack of troops, the poorly con-
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structed military objectives, and the poor command 
structure. Solana explained that the absence of a 
strong and unified European Union was partly to blame. 
He said, “The memories of that monstrous crime still 
haunt us all …The victims had put their trust in inter-
national protection. But we, the international commu-
nity, let them down. This was a colossal, collective and 
shameful failure.”27    This disaster happened in 1995 
before the Internet was ubiquitous in European house-
holds.  Even so, this catastrophe was such an em-
barrassment that ten years later, after a report came 
out, the government of the Netherlands resigned.28 
Such a turn of events could taint the EU model forever. 
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the june 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections pro-
duced a victory for the center-right, a striking defeat 
for the center-left, an unexpectedly strong showing for 
Greens as well as right-wing Eurosceptics, and a re-
cord abstention rate. Much of the media coverage of the 
elections has highlighted the ‘second order’ nature of 
European elections. Second-order elections have less 
at stake than first-order national elections, because 
they neither decide directly who is in power, nor do they 
determine what policies are pursued in the policy ar-
eas the public finds most important. Accordingly, such 
elections can be expected to feature lower turnout lev-
els, protest voting which will hurt government parties 
(especially at the middle of the electoral cycle), and 
more votes for smaller parties (Reif & Schmitt, 1980).
Since Reif and Schmitt introduced the notion of 
second order elections in 1980, their model has been 
further elaborated and tested in both the popular me-
dia and the academic literature (e.g. Marsh, 2005; 
Reif, 1997; Schmitt, 2005). Though the supportive 
evidence is strong, the model has some important 
weaknesses. First, if the importance of elections is 
a key factor in driving turnout, then the rising power 
of both the EU and the EP ought to have been ac-
companied by higher turnout. However, turnout has 
been fairly stable within individual countries, espe-
cially if one controls for the timing of electoral cycles 
(van der Eijk & Schmitt, 2007). Second, major gov-
ernment parties do not appear to perform systemati-
cally worse than do the main opposition parties (Op-
penhuis, van der Eijk, & Franklin, 1996). Third, smaller 
parties do appear to do better especially when they 
adopt extreme positions on EU issues (Reif, 1997). 
In fact, a growing number of articles suggests 
that EP elections are not simply second-order elec-
tions: the European context matters too. Hix and 
Marsh found that anti-EU parties perform better in 
EP elections than in national elections, as do green 
parties which emphasize the transnational nature of 
environmental issues. Socialist parties, on the other 
hand, perform relatively poorly (2007). Along simi-
lar lines, Ferrara and Weishaupt suggest that par-
ties that fail to “get their act together” on European 
issues systematically perform worse in EP elections 
(2004). Still, Hix and Marsh conclude that the sec-
ond order effects dominate, while “Europe mat-
ters” effects are minor at best (2007, pp. 506-507). 
This contribution offers a first assessment of the 
2009 EP elections. The results continue to support 
the second order model more strongly than the Eu-
rope matters model. However, this outcome is driven 
in part by choices made by national parties, rather 
than by voters. Many national parties treat Europe-
an elections as second order elections, leaving vot-
ers little choice but to behave accordingly. Evidence 
suggests that when parties approach the EP elec-
tions as first order elections for the European level 
of governance, voters will respond. I consider in turn 
three features of the recent elections: turnout, the 
performance of the main government and opposition 
parties, and the performance of smaller parties. In 
each section, I briefly present some overall patterns 
and look more closely at the experience of a single 
country where the results were of particular interest.
Turnout
Turnout for the 2009 EP elections was the lowest 
ever, at 43.08%, compared to 45.47% in 2004, and 
61.99% at the first EP elections in 1979.1  However, 
turnout has actually risen in some countries. In Den-
mark it reached a record high of 59.54%, compared 
to a previous high of 52.92% in 1994. Sweden, too, 
saw a record turnout, at 45.53%. Both the Nether-
lands and the UK saw a decline from 2004, but re-
corded higher levels of participation than in 1999. 
While average turnout was lower in Eastern Europe, 
the picture there was mixed too. For example, Es-
tonia and Latvia saw large increases compared to 
2004, but in Lithuania turnout fell by more than half.2 
Commentators frequently suggest that absten-
tion is strategic: people believe that any vote indi-
rectly conveys approval for the EU as a project (e.g. 
Chavannes, 2009). However, more systematic re-
search shows that disapproval of the EU is at best 
a marginal contributor to non-voting (van der Eijk & 
Schmitt, 2007). Still, once one controls for country-
specific incidental determinants of turnout (such as 
simultaneous local elections) and average support 
for European integration (cf. Mattila, 2003), strik-
ing cross-national differences in turnout remain. 
For example, turnout in the Netherlands was much 
lower than one might expect given public interest in 
European integration issues. Dutch public aware-
ness of European Union politics was boosted by the 
referendum on the European Constitution in 2005, 
which drew 63.3% of registered voters. In early 2009, 
Eurobarometer (EB) 71 found that 58% of Dutch re-
spondents expressed an interest in the upcoming 
European Parliament elections, compared to an EU 
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average of just 44%. Moreover, in the fall of 2008 (EB 
70), 59% indicated that they would probably vote in 
the elections (9 or 10 on a scale of 1-10), again well 
above the EU average (34%). However, by early 2009 
this figure had fallen to 47%, and the final turnout was 
just 36.75%, well below the EU average of 43.08%. 
If the low turnout in the Netherlands was not a 
result of a lack of interest, neither was it driven by a 
perception that the European Parliament does not 
matter. In fact, 64% of Dutch survey respondents 
in EB 71 believed that the role of the EP has been 
strengthened in the last 10 years — more than in any 
other EU member state. Nor can dissatisfaction with 
Prime Minister Balkenende’s government explain 
the high abstention rate: turnout was not affected 
in several other member states where the govern-
ment was at least as unpopular, such as in Ireland.
Two factors appear to explain Dutch non-voting. 
First, the largest parties struggled with the best way to 
convey their message on Europe to the public. Mind-
ful of the failed referendum of 2005, they did not want 
to appear naively pro-EU. Hoping to offer a nuanced 
approach, they mostly failed to offer a clear vision for 
the EU (Broer & Derkzen, 2009). Second, the name 
recognition of most candidates for MEP was rather 
low. In fact, the Labour Party (PvdA) was turned down 
by five different prominent party members who were 
asked to lead the campaign, and had to settle in the 
end for Thijs Berman, previously known to just 3% 
of Dutch voters (Doorduyn & Sommer, 2009). Geert 
Wilders’ far-right Freedom Party (PVV) resolved the 
problem best by simply putting Wilders on its cam-
paign posters next to unknown campaign leader Barry 
Madlener. As Simon Hix recently noted, connections 
between citizens and their MEPs are much stron-
ger in Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. Not 
coincidentally, turnout figures were well above aver-
age in each of these states (Banner & Zandt, 2009).
Major political parties and the European 
Parliament
Across the European Union, Socialists and Social 
Democrats performed much worse than expected, 
while centre-right parties performed better. While the 
second order model predicts that the main govern-
ment parties will be punished most in such elections, 
that pattern did not hold for the centre-right parties in 
such major member states as France, Germany, Italy, 
or Poland, nor in smaller states such as the Nether-
lands or Austria. Ruling socialists were punished, 
however, in the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, 
and the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, social democrats even fell to third place 
behind the main centre right party and upstart right-
wing Eurosceptic parties. In France, the opposition 
Socialist Party only narrowly escaped a similar fate, 
finishing a distant second behind the ruling UMP, and 
only barely ahead of the Greens (Europe-Ecologie), 
with 16.48% of votes cast compared to 16.28%. 
How did centre-right government parties avoid 
punishment, while centre-left opposition parties 
failed to do so? The Economist suggests that cen-
tre-right parties have managed to steal some of the 
left’s rhetoric, in particular in France ("The European 
Elections: Swing Low, Swing Right," 2009). How-
ever, campaign choices related to the parties’ vision 
for European integration appear to have played an 
equally significant role. Socialists were not helped 
by their European party group, the Party of Europe-
an Socialists (PES). Leading up to the election, the 
PES had been unable to agree on a candidate for 
Commission President, preventing them from mak-
ing this an electoral issue. Moreover, the PES elec-
tion manifesto was short on tangible policy proposals.
Many Labour and Socialist Parties were further 
hurt by internal divisions. The Dutch Labour Party pro-
filed itself as ambivalently pro-EU, and its leader ad-
mitted to voting for a Eurosceptic candidate on its lists 
(Doorduyn & Sommer, 2009). A similar lack of clarity 
bedeviled the French Socialists. Indeed, its leader ad-
mitted that her party had failed to make itself credible 
("The European Elections: Swing Low, Swing Right," 
2009). In contrast, the ruling centre-right party, the 
UMP boasted a much clearer European image, thanks 
in part to President Sarkozy’s activities during France’s 
EU presidency in the second half of 2008. Moreover, 
Sarkozy restated his vision for Europe in opening the 
UMP’s election campaign on May 5th. The Socialists 
responded to Sarkozy’s speech in two ways. First, 
they published a 32-page report titled “L’échec” (the 
failure), attacking Sarkozy’s performance as presi-
dent, but focusing almost entirely on domestic poli-
tics; less than a page and a half were dedicated to 
the EU (2009). Second, rather than engage Sarkozy’s 
speech directly and outline their own vision for Eu-
rope, opposition politicians criticized the president for 
getting involved in the campaign as a head of state 
(Leijendekker, 2009). Unsurprisingly, neither of these 
undertakings did much to help their electoral fortunes.
The performance of small parties 
Unlike the Socialist Party, the French Greens (Eu-
rope-Écologie) formulated a vision for the European 
Union that was both coherent and substantively differ-
ent from that of the UMP. In addition, their campaign 
was led by the very well-known Daniel Cohn-Bendit, 
along with local leaders in the different electoral dis-
tricts who were carefully selected for their commit-
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ment to European and environmental issues. Voters 
rewarded them accordingly, making them the largest 
Green party in the EP. Green parties were also quite 
successful in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and the Nordic countries. Even the UK Greens man-
aged to obtain 8.4% of the vote, up from 6.2% five 
years earlier. On the other hand, Greens in Ireland did 
poorly, apparently being punished for cooperating with 
the unpopular Fianna Fáil government. Greens also 
did less well in Southern and Eastern member states. 
Right-wing Eurosceptic parties were the other big 
winners, with particularly strong results in the United 
Kingdom for both the UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
and the British National Party (BNP). Other countries 
in which right-wing, anti-EU and anti-immigrant parties 
did well include the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, 
Austria, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slova-
kia. On the other hand, France’s National Front con-
tinued a long-term decline and did rather poorly, as did 
the trans-European Libertas party. Bankrolled by Ire-
land’s Declan Ganley, who had predicted that his party 
would win at least 15 seats across Europe (McGee, 
2009), the party picked up just a single MEP: France’s 
Philippe de Villiers, a Eurosceptic who had performed 
better in the past running at the head of his own party.
Once again, differences in performance can be 
traced at least in part to whether parties offered a 
clear vision for Europe and put forward well-known 
and experienced candidates. This held true not just 
for parties at the ends of the political spectrum, but 
for centrist parties as well. In France, François Bay-
rou’s centrists received just 8.4 percent of the vote, 
far less than in the 2007 presidential elections. Bay-
rou’s choice to profile himself as the anti-Sarkozy 
backfired as voters concluded that he had little to 
say about Europe. In contrast, the Dutch centre-left 
party D66, whose campaign poster unambiguous-
ly read “Europe / Yes / D66” did unexpectedly well. 
Of particular interest are the results in the United 
Kingdom, where both the Greens and the right-wing 
Eurosceptics did very well. The Greens increased 
their share of the vote to 8.4%, finishing fifth over-
all. The anti-EU UK Independence Party outpolled 
Labour, receiving 16.09% of the total vote, while 
the even more nationalist British National Party re-
ceived 6.04%, earning it its first two MEPs ever. 
The success of the three smaller parties was due 
in part to public anger at the MP expenses scandal, 
which primarily affected the three major parties (La-
bour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats). 
Perhaps the key reason for the improved performance 
of the smaller parties, however, is that support for La-
bour collapsed, for the reasons predicted by the second 
order model. In fact, the UKIP actually received fewer 
votes than in 2004: their vote share rose only because 
so many voters deserted Labour. The BNP did attract 
more votes overall, but actually lost votes in the two 
districts where it won an MEP. The Greens performed 
best in this respect, attracting 27% more votes, no 
doubt thanks in part to their clear and positive take on 
European integration. The added votes did not trans-
late into additional seats, however, although they were 
just 5000 votes away from denying the BNP’s leader 
victory in the North-West electoral district (Dunt, 2009).
Conclusion
Much of what we know about European Parlia-
ment elections is due to the work of scholars collabo-
rating in the European Election Studies project (www.
ees-homepage.net and www.piredeu.eu). Over the 
next few years, data on the 2009 elections will be thor-
oughly analyzed by these and other scholars, adding 
to our knowledge. A more systematic analysis will also 
permit us to improve our understanding of EP elec-
tions in the newer member states, whose party sys-
tems are much younger and who have less experience 
with voting in the EU context. It appears likely that the 
resulting findings will support both the second order 
and the “Europe matters” models. In fact, as I have 
tried to suggest in the impressionistic analysis here, it 
may be fruitful to develop a new approach combining 
the two models: second order effects dominate when 
parties—and party systems — make it difficult for vot-
ers to treat the election as a first order election. Parties 
with a clear European vision and with politicians dedi-
cated to making that vision a reality—even if that vision 
is to dismantle the EU—are likely to well. Parties that 
are ambivalent about the EU or that themselves treat 
the election as secondary force voters to do likewise. 
Maurits van der Veen is Assistant Professor of Inter-
national Affairs at the School of Public and Interna-
tional Affairs, University of Georgia.
Notes
1 Unless otherwise noted, all data on turnout 
and election results are drawn from the European 
Union’s valuable election results website: www.
elections2009-results.eu. Data was provisional as of 
18 June 2009.
2 Turnout is inevitably affected by factors that fit 
neither the second order model nor the Europe mat-
ters model. Voting is mandatory in Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, and Malta. In Italy, provincial and communal 
elections were held at the same time, boosting votes. 
In Lithuania, election fatigue following a presidential 
election just 3 weeks earlier caused turnout to plum-
22     Summer 2009  EUSA Review
met. In neighbouring Latvia, the election for mayor of 
Riga coincided with the EP election, causing a large 
jump in turnout. Finally, Estonia boosted participa-
tion by becoming the first EU member state to allow 
online voting.
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Book Reviews
Ruud J.A. Muffels (ed.). Flexibility and employment 
security in Europe. Labour markets in transition. Chel-
tenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc., 2008. 
this edited book studies the development of flexicurity 
practices in Europe. Compared to the expanding lit-
erature on this question, this book introduces a series 
of theoretical, empirical and political innovations. In 
terms of theoretical debate, it discusses the accuracy 
of the flexicurity concept compared to the transitional 
labour market thesis. From an empirical point of view, 
it contains several comparative case studies based on 
the analysis of some European longitudinal statistical 
data (in particular, the European Community House-
hold Panel). Finally, the authors question some best 
practices aimed at implementing flexicurity in national 
employment public policies.
Compared to Gunther Schmid’s transitional labor 
market (TLM) theory, the flexicurity concept proposes 
a broader and more integrated approach. While, the 
TLM theory focuses on the need for a better collective 
regulation of the labor market including better equip-
ment for workers in terms of training and wage secu-
rity, the flexicurity approach insists on the need to go 
beyond the resort to labor market regulation (external 
flexibility) by taking into account the strategies of in-
ternal flexibility (working time flexibility, multi-skilling, 
job rotation, freelance, temporary work, etc.) available 
to firms seeking greater flexibility. The flexicurity ap-
proach also seems more integrated because it asserts 
as essential the need to counterbalance flexibility and 
security at the same time in a win-win game for employ-
ees and employers where active labor market policies 
play an incentive role. Unfortunately, this book does 
not provide a theoretical discussion of flexicurity as a 
concept. For instance it could have been analyzed as 
a rather dull notion stemming from Danish and Dutch 
employment and social policies during the 1990s that 
were raised to the rank of a prescriptive goal by the 
European Commission. Moreover, flexicurity could 
have been unpacked as an unstable theoretical notion 
which binds together under an umbrella term some dif-
ferent and potentially contradictory policy objectives, 
instruments and institutions. 
Grounded on an important series of empirical 
data, this book nevertheless provides an interesting 
discussion of the so-called “scarring effect thesis.” 
This debate relates to the question of the long term 
consequences of increasing professional instability. 
The issue is as follows: does the balance between a 
simultaneous development of flexibility and security 
lead to a “zero sum” effect or produce inactivity traps 
where, in the long term, low skilled and socially disad-
vantaged workers remain captured in weakened posi-
tions? The tenets of the flexicurity thesis affirm that 
atypical forms of employment, temporary jobs and all 
other kinds of flexible work can be used as by individu-
als as stepping stones to build a professional career in 
adequacy with today’s economic constraints. The data 
provided by this book offers some empirically ground-
ed answers to this set of questions stemming from a 
large range of individual situations such as: tempo-
rary jobs (A. Debels), long term unemployment effects 
(M. Gangl), self employment (N. Meager, 2008), part 
time jobs and the consequences of childcare breaks 
(D. Fouarge and R.Muffels). The main findings of this 
comparative study reveal some tangible negative ef-
fects of work instability and underline the strong role 
played by national institutional patterns (labour market 
regulations, social protection systems) in lowering or 
increasing these effects. 
Indeed, more generally the comparative perspec-
tive of this book, strongly linked here to varieties of 
capitalism or social state models, unveils evidence of 
the institutional variable among different regimes (lib-
eral and market coordinated economies in particular) 
as a means of explaining differing labor market perfor-
mances. The main conclusion here is that unregulated 
labor markets perform better than regulated ones in 
finding permanent jobs for flexible workers. From there 
it is then argued that workers be made more flexible 
while the state should ensure better safety nets and 
fair income security! Unsurprisingly the book then con-
cludes on the appropriateness of the EU’s promotion 
of flexicurity based on the enforcement of common 
principles that are respectful of both national policies 
and social partnership design. However, a gap in the 
book concerns discussion on the relationship between 
public policy issues (dealt with mainly in the third and 
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final section of the book dedicated to best practices 
in Australia, Canada and Denmark), and the role of 
cultural and social norms (for example concerning 
women’s life/work balance during childcare). In prac-
tice, this link often proves vital in achieving the institu-
tional trade-offs necessary to develop positive flexicu-
rity policies. This criticism in turn leads to a final one 
concerning another omission in this very interesting 
book: the perspective of the firm and the role of social 
partnership in negotiating the compromises necessary 
to set a fair balance between flexibility and security. 
Although the authors acknowledge this lacunae (and 
attribute it partially to a lack of comparative longitudi-
nal data), more pointers for future research in this area 
would have been highly welcome. 
Thierry Berthet
University of Bordeaux
Catherine Barnard and Okeoghene Odudu (eds.). 
The Outer Limits of European Union Law.   Oxford, 
UK: Hart Publishing, 2009.
a comprehensive determination of precisely where the 
outer limits of EU law lie is neither sought nor achieved 
by this edited collection. Rather, it seeks to (and does) 
offer a range of insights into the wider debate around 
outer limits, which the editors, Catherine Barnard and 
Okeoghene Odudu describe as “often ill-informed.” To 
that end, they have presented a collection of work that 
captures mostly (but not exclusively) legal perspec-
tives on the question of outer limits and which covers a 
range of different and key policy fields (four freedoms, 
EU citizenship, competition law, defence industries 
and European police cooperation) as well as what 
we might call some key “power-related” issues (legal 
bases, legitimacy and how powers are conceptualised 
and delimited in a multi-level and highly integrated le-
gal system). The final three chapters of the book focus 
specifically upon the topic of remedies. Taken as a 
whole, this collection informs the reader of the com-
plexities, nuances and fluidity at play in any analysis 
of the EU’s outer limits. To that end, its readership de-
serves to be wide and multi-disciplinary.
The editors’ introductory chapter clearly explains 
the context and parameters of the outer limits project 
explored in the book and skilfully weaves each of the 
contributions into a lively and informative piece of aca-
demic analysis on the limits of EU law in its own right. 
Space precludes me from discussing each of the con-
tributions and so I merely mention some of them on 
the basis that they illustrate well what I think are some 
of the key points of interest to emerge from the book. 
First, the shifting contours of power between Mem-
ber States and the EU in a variety of different fields are 
demonstrated quite vividly by the book (see particular-
ly the chapters by Koutrakos, Dougan,  Nic Shuibne, 
Barnard and Ward.) Interestingly, while the impetus, 
quality, institutional vehicles and consequences of 
such shifts clearly vary depending upon the topic un-
der review, the traffic is all going in the same direction: 
power is essentially moving away from the national 
state and towards the EU. 
Second, traditional conceptions of power (in es-
sence, the inner and outer limits of EU legal compe-
tence and the division of sites between the EU level 
and the nation state) and associated debates (such as 
accountability and legitimacy) remain important and 
contentious as the chapters by Weatherill and Dash-
wood demonstrate. However, it is equally clear that 
the realities of the multi-level and network governance 
environment of the EU today demand a fresh look at 
power dynamics and how power should and could be 
limited. The chapters by Hofmann and (to some ex-
tent) Shaw reveal some of the different challenges and 
possibilities at play here. Undoubtedly, this will be a 
growth area of research in coming years.
Third and finally, a particularly striking feature to 
emerge from this collection, but perhaps not that sur-
prising for those with some background in European 
integration, is the prominence of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) in defining and refining the outer lim-
its of the European Union. Of course, as the book 
reveals, there are fields and realms over which the 
ECJ’s involvement is limited, (see Lachmeyer on po-
licing and Hofmann on ”new governance”) but through 
the adoption of various interpretative techniques and 
the dynamic use of the general principles of Commu-
nity law (such as effectiveness and proportionality) 
the ECJ has in many areas pushed the boundaries 
of EU law. Whether it has gone too far and the extent 
to which clear boundaries are achieved is often de-
batable, but always fascinating (see for instance the 
chapters by Spaventa and Nazzini in the realm of post 
–”Keck” free movement of goods and competition law 
remedies respectively.)
As with all edited collections based upon confer-
ence proceedings - in this case a seminar hosted by 
the Centre for European Legal Studies in Cambridge in 
September 2007 - there is some variation in style and 
quality across the contributions. Ultimately however, 
this does not detract from the final product, which is an 
interesting and diverse collection around a worthy and 
stimulating topic. Nice book sleeve too!
Maria Fletcher
University of Glasgow
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thors claim, these modes of governance do not signifi-
cantly differ from those practised at the national level. 
However, they do still differ, first, in their impact, since 
the multilevel system of the EU offers more resources 
and opportunities to the actors (including an exit option), 
and second, in their relation to the institutional structure 
of the system since the nature of the EU implies “on the 
one hand, a comparatively higher demand for negotia-
tion, cooperation, and competition and, on the other, a 
higher degree of constraints for taking recourse to hier-
archy as a mode of governance” (p. 22-23).
The analysis made on the basis of this approach 
shows that, contrary to what is commonly agreed, the 
EU is not only driving towards ever softer modes of gov-
ernance (such as in environment policy), but that some 
case studies (eg. monetary policy) provide examples of 
movement in the opposite direction, ie with hierarchy 
acting as a catalyst for the emergence of other modes of 
governance (such as sport policy or competition policy); 
with voluntary cooperation used to reinforce the impact 
of hierarchy and the transposition of legislation (such 
as social policy). The main change is thus to be found 
in convergence around hybrid forms of governance 
(harder and softer, traditional and more recent) and an 
increasing variety of stakeholders. However, according 
to this book the innovative character of EU governance 
–seen as the combination of complementary modes of 
governance – is not to be mistaken with temporal “new-
ness”. Indeed, the thesis of innovation is not necessar-
ily supported by a historical perspective in many policy 
areas.
If one was to regret something concerning this book, 
it would be that when dealing with “the politics of mul-
tilevel policymaking” it remains focused on the policy-
making and institutional dimensions of EU governance. 
The question of the reasons for the recourse to inno-
vative and combined modes of governance is not fully 
addressed. In particular, the EU’s dual legitimacy crisis 
-distrust from European citizens; and the unwillingness 
of the Member States to delegate power– and their 
feedback effects on the equilibriums of the EU political 
system remains outside the “picture” examined in this 
publication. However, the exploration it presents of the 
relationships between change in the steering modes of 
EU public action and broader shifts in the political sys-
tem of the EU do begin to shed light upon a two-sided 
mode of transformation: incremental change in pro-
cess governance but also transformative change when 
it comes to “the state of the Union”  – especially the 




Tömmel, Ingeborg and Amy Verdun. Innovative Gov-
ernance in the European Union. The Politics of Multi-
level Policymaking. Boulder, Co and London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2009.
for more than a decade now European studies has ex-
perienced an intense flourishing of academic and ex-
pert publications on the development of what is usu-
ally labelled “the new modes of European governance.” 
Some authors have referred to a “governance turn,” and 
one can even consider that the analysis of the nature, 
the meaning and the potential impact of this “new” gov-
ernance has given birth to a scientific industry – with its 
“stars,” its language, its reviews and its research pro-
grammes. These publications have even been categor-
ised according to their point of view on the phenomenon 
of “new modes of governance,” ie. whether they adopt 
a theoretical, a normative, an empirical or a critical ap-
proach to this subject .
The good news regarding this book edited by Inge-
borg Tömmel and Amy Verdun is that it is not just an-
other collection of case studies on the emergence and 
development of forms of governance in the EU which de-
part from the “traditional” Community method. Instead, 
Innovative Governance in the European Union. The 
Politics of Multilevel Policymaking asks “what the spe-
cific characteristics of European modes of governance 
across policy areas are and how EU governance and 
policymaking differ from those at the national level” (p. 
vii). Indeed, it provides here some extremely precious 
clarification. This coherent volume – including its three 
precise and sharp introductory and concluding chap-
ters, but also a very rich collection of high-quality sector 
chapters -which each meet the challenge of tracing the 
evolution of the modes of governance without forget-
ting substance – is both dense and analytical enough to 
help students as well as specialists find their way into a 
complex area of publications and, in so doing, prevent 
them from being drowned by multiple and contradictory 
categories and binary oppositions (such as constraint 
vs voluntarism, top-down vs bottom-up, uniformity vs 
diversity, rigidity vs flexibility, closed processes vs ope-
ness, hierarchy vs transversality, majoritarian ruling vs 
deliberation etc.).
The editors first provide a useful recapitulative ty-
pology of the modes of governance in the EU through 
which they distinguish the process dimension of gover-
nance and policymaking, from the structural dimension 
of governance, i.e. “the institutions and actors involved in 
the process that form its basic constituents” (p. 13). Ac-
cording to this analysis, the basic modes of governance 
exercised in the EU are: hierarchy (implementation of 
legislation); negotiation (linked to consensus-building); 
competition (linked to pressure) and cooperation (linked 
to coordination and voluntarism). In essence, the au-
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